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Abstract. Flow-based intrusion detection has recently become a promising se-
curity mechanism in high speed networks (1-10 Gbps). Despite the richness in
contributions in this field, benchmarking of flow-based IDS is still an open issue.
In this paper, we propose the first publicly available, labeled data set for flow-
based intrusion detection. The data set aims to be realistic, i.e., representative of
real traffic and complete from a labeling perspective. Our goal is to provide such
enriched data set for tuning, training and evaluating ID systems. Our setup is
based on a honeypot running widely deployed services and directly connected to
the Internet, ensuring attack-exposure. The final data set consists of 14.2M flows
and more than 98% of them has been labeled.
1 Introduction
Considering the increasing number of security incidents and discovered vulnerabilities
per year [1], it is not surprising that intrusion detection (ID) has become an important
research area in the last decade. A large number of ID techniques have been proposed
and many of them have been implemented as prototypes or in commercial products.
Moreover, the research community has recently focused on flow-based approaches.
When proposing a new intrusion detection system (IDS), researchers usually evalu-
ate it by testing it on labeled (or annotated) traffic traces, i.e., traffic traces with known
and marked anomalies and incidents [2]. Labeled traces are important to compare the
performance of diverse detection methods, to measure parameter effectiveness and to
fine-tune the systems. Ideally, a labeled traffic trace should have the following proper-
ties: it should be realistic (opposed to “artificial”), completely labeled, containing the
attack types of interest and, not less importantly, publicly available. Despite the impor-
tance of labeled traces, research on IDS generally suffers of a lack of shared data sets
for benchmarking and evaluation. Moreover, we have no knowledge of any publicly
available flow-based traffic trace that satisfies all these criteria.
Several difficulties prevent the research community to create and publish such traces,
in first place the problem of balancing between privacy and realism. It is natural that the
most realistic traces are those collected “in the wild”, for example at Internet service
providers or in corporate networks. Unfortunately, these traces would reveal privacy
sensitive information about the involved entities and hence are rarely published. On the
other hand, artificial traces, i.e., traces that have not been collected but artificially gener-
ated, can avoid the problem of privacy but they usually require higher effort and deeper
domain knowledge to achieve a realistic result. Moreover, labeling is a time consuming
process: it could easily be achieved on short traces, but these traces could present only
a limited amount of security events. Therefore, most publications use non-public traffic
traces for evaluation purposes. The only notable exception is the well-known DARPA
traces [3–5], which still are, despite their age, the only publicly available labeled data
sets specifically created for intrusion detection systems evaluation.
In this paper, we present the first labeled flow-based data set. We describe how a
suitable traffic trace can be collected and how it can be labeled. A flow is defined as
“a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time
interval and having a set of common properties” [6]. Our final data set will contain
only flows and full-packet content will be used only as additional information source
during the labeling process. Concentrating on flow-based data sets is in our opinion
important for mainly two reasons. First, it substantially reduces the privacy concerns
compared to a packet-based data set: since there is no payload, it is possible to deal
with privacy issues by anonymizing the IP addresses. Second, several promising results
have been recently proposed in the flow-based intrusion detection research community
(for example, [7–9]): we feel that especially now there is the need for a shared flow data
set.
Publications on the labeling of non-artificial data traces are rare and, as said, we
are not aware of any concerned flow-based data sets. WebClass [10], a web-based tool
that allows people to contribute to manually label traffic time-series, has not found
much interest in the community. More effort has been done in the creation of artificial
data sets. The already mentioned DARPA trace consists of generated traffic, equivalent
to the traffic at a government site containing several hundreds of users on thousands
of network hosts. In [11], the authors propose the synthetic generation of flow-level
traffic traces, however without discussing its technical implementation. The malicious-
traffic generation in the MACE [12] and FLAME [13] frameworks are performed by
mixing background traffic with the output of different attack and anomalies modules.
In MACE, it is up to the user to create a realistic traffic trace by providing an appropriate
configuration file.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe and
discuss the data collection setup. The processing of the collected data and the labeling
of the found intrusions and anomalies is described in Section 3. The resulting data
set and its characteristics are discussed in Section 4. Finally, the paper concludes with
Section 5.
2 Data collection
A proper measurement setup depends on the requirements we expect the labeled data
set to meet. In our case, we want the data set to be realistic, as complete in labeling
as possible, correct, achievable in a acceptable labeling time and of a sufficient trace
size. In our research, we studied diverse approaches to data collection. In Section 2.1
we present our operational experience, explaining strengths and drawbacks of possible
measurement infrastructures according to our data set requirements. In addition, Section
2.2 describes the technical details of our measurement setup.
2.1 Operational experience in data collection
This subsection will discuss the impact of both measurement scales and flow collection
location on our requirements.
Measurement scale Flows can be collected at different measurement scales. The Uni-
versity of Twente has a 10 Gbps optical Internet connection with an average load of
650 Mbps and peaks up to 1.0 Gbps. Several hundred million flows are exported per
day [8]. Traces collected on this network would for sure be realistic, but we cannot ac-
complish the goals of completeness in labeling and reasonable creation time. Labeling
network-wide traces suffers of scalability issues.
Let us now concentrate on a small subnetwork that is primarily used by us for re-
search purposes. Due to the limited number of users, it should be easy to distinguish
trusted IP addresses from unknown ones, leaving out only a small fraction of suspicious
traffic to be further analyzed. However, our findings show that more than 60% of the
connections cannot easily be categorized as malicious or benign. Collecting on a small
subnetwork ensures us to have a realistic data set, but, as for the network scale, it would
be neither complete nor achievable in a short time.
A different setup, and the one that we finally chose, is based on monitoring a sin-
gle host with enhanced logging specifically tuned to track malicious activities, e.g., a
honeypot. A honeypot can be defined as an “environment where vulnerabilities have
been deliberately introduced to observe attacks and intrusions” [14]. In this case, the
trace size would be smaller and the labeling time limited. Moreover, an everyday ser-
vice setup would ensure the traffic to be realistic. Finally, the logs would ensure us to
achieve both completeness and correctness in labeling.
Flow collection location We have different options about the flow collection location,
while we collect logs on our honeypot. A possibility is to collect the flows generated
by a Netflow enabled router, in our case the University one. However, decoupling the
flow creation from the log location introduces errors in measurements, such as timing
delays and split TCP sessions. These issues make impossible to properly associate a
security event with the flow that caused it. A data set based on these premises would
have a serious lack in completeness and correctness. Another possibility is therefore to
dump only the traffic reaching the honeypot and to create the flows off-line after the
data collection is completed. This decision allows to have complete control over the
flow-creation process, overcoming the problem of the session splitting.
Discussion We will now summarize the methods we studied for the data set collec-
tion, showing if they meet our requirements. Please note that, since monitoring the
university network or a subnetwork does not scale, we did not explore further the op-
tions of online/offline flow creation. All our approaches ensure the trace to be realistic.
Moreover, monitoring the University network or a subnetwork would also provide suf-
ficiently large traces. After we measured the traffic reaching our honeypot, we can say
that also in this case this requirement can be met. Regarding completeness and correct-
ness, large network traces reduce the trust we can have on the labeled data set. The
honeypot approach is more reliable since it offers additional logging information, but
in this case, the flow collection/creation is crucial. As previously in this section, relying
on external flow sources can introduce measurement errors. Creating the flows offline,
on the other hand, allows to have flows that better suit the needs of a labeled data set.
Finally, large infrastructures suffer of scalability in labeling time, while the honeypot
setup overcomes this problem.
From this section, we can conclude that monitoring a single host that has enhanced
logging capabilities is a promising setup for flow-based data sets.
2.2 Experimental setup
Our honeypot was installed on a virtual machine running on Citrix XenServer 5 [15].
The decision to run the honeypot as a virtualized host is due to the flexibility to in-
stall, configure and recover the virtual machine in case it is compromised. In addition,
a compromised virtual machine can be saved for further analysis. Diverse scenarios are
possible, in terms of number of virtual machines, operative systems and software. Our
experimental setup consisted of a single virtual machine, on which we installed a Linux
distribution (Debian Etch 4.0). In order to keep the setup simple, controllable and realis-
tic, we decided not to rely on honeypot software, but to configure the host by ourselves.
In particular, the following services have been installed:
– ssh: OpenSSH service [16]. Beside the traditional service logs, the OpenSSH ser-
vice running on Debian has been patched in order to log sessions: for each login, the
transcript (user typed commands) and the timing of the session have been recorded.
This patch is particularly important to track active hacking activities.
– Apache web server: a simple webpage with a log in form has been deployed. We
relied on the service logging capabilities for checking the content of the incoming
http connections.
– ftp: The chosen service was proftp [17]. As for http, we relied on the ftp
logs for monitoring attempted and successful connections. proftp uses the
auth/ident service running on port 113 for additional authentication informa-
tion about incoming connections.
Along with the service logs, we decided to dump all the traffic that reached the hon-
eypot during our observation period. The virtual machine ran for 6 days, from Tuesday
23 September 2008 12:40:00 GMT to Monday 29 September 2008 22:40:00 GMT. The
honeypot was hosted in the university network and directly connected to the Internet.
The monitoring window is comprehensive of both working days and weekend days.
The data collection resulted in a 24 GB dump file containing 155.2 million packets.
3 Data processing and labeling
The labeling process enriches the data trace with information about (i) the type and
structure of the malicious traffic, (ii) dependencies between single isolated malicious
activities. The latter is particularly important for a flow-based data set where by design
no further detail on the content of the communication is available to the end user. In this
Fig. 1. From raw data (packets and logs) to the labeled data-set
section, we describe the processing of the collected traffic data and how the labeling
information is generated and structured.
Figure 1 gives an overview on the whole data processing and labeling. As a first step,
shown in the left part of the figure, the collected traffic dumps are converted into flows.
In addition, the data extracted from the diverse log files is converted into a common
format (log events) that simplifies the following processing steps. The resulting flow
records and log events feed the alert generation/correlation process. Finally, a post-
processing step generates additional information, namely the so-called cluster alerts and
the causality information. The different steps are explained in the following Sections 3.1
through 3.4.
3.1 From packets to flows
The first step is the creation of flows from the traffic trace. In our data set, a flow closely
follows the Netflow v5 definition and has the following form:
F = (Isrc, Idst, Psrc, Pdst, P ckts,Octs, Tstart, Tend, F lags, Prot)
where the unidirectional communication is defined by the source and destination IP
addresses Isrc and Idst, the employed ports Psrc and Pdst (in case of UDP/TCP traffic),
and the level 3 protocol type Prot. The fields Pckts and Octs give the total number of
packets and octets, respectively, in the data exchange; the TCP header flags are stored
as a binary OR of the flags in all the packets of the flow (field Flags); the start and end
time of the flow are given in Tstart, respectively, Tend in millisecond resolution. The
flow creation has been performed using a modified version of softflowd[18].
3.2 From log files to log events
Information about attacks against our honeypot can be extracted from the log files of
the services we were monitoring. In order to simplify the alert generation process, the
relevant data found in the various log files is converted into log events. A log event
consists of the following information:
L = (T, Isrc, Psrc, Idst, Pdst, Descr, Auto, Succ, Corr)
where T gives the timestamp of the attack (as found in the logs), Isrc and Psrc give the
IP address and used port (if available) of the attacker, and Idst andPdst give the attacked
IP address (our honeypot) and port number. In addition, a deeper analysis of the log files
reveals whether an attack was automated or manual and succeeded or failed (flags Auto
and Succ, respectively). The field Descr allows us to enrich the data set with additional
information retrieved from the log files. The field Corr is always initialized to false
and later used by the alert generation process.
3.3 Alert generation and correlation
Goal of this step is to generate so-called alerts and to correlate each generated alert
to one or more flows. An alert describes a security incident and is represented by the
following tuple:
A = (T,Descr,Auto, Succ, Serv, T ype)
The fields T , Descr, Auto, Succ are defined as for the log events (see Section 3.2).
The field Serv gives the service addressed by the security incident, for example ssh or
http. The Type field describes the type of the incident. The alert generation process
consists of three steps that are explained in the following.
Alerts from log events For attacks toward the honeypot, alerts can be directly gener-
ated from the log events. The fields T , Descr, Auto, Succ of an alert record are set to
the values of the corresponding fields of the log event. The Serv field is set accordingly
to the destination port field of the log event, for example Serv = ssh if Pdst = 22.
The Type field is always set to the value CONN, indicating that the alert describes a
malicious connection attempt.
In order to correlate an alert with a flow, we have to find the flow that corresponds to
the log event from which the alert has been generated. This is not a trivial task since the
timing information extracted from a log file may not be aligned with the flow’s one. In
addition, we would like to not only correlate the incoming (as seen from the honeypot)
flow to the alert but also the response flow of the honeypot.
We use the flows as starting point for the alert generation and correlation. This
avoids that a flow is correlated to more than one alert. The resulting procedure for
a service s is shown in Algorithm 1. As a first step, a best matching response flow
is selected for each flow of the considered service (lines 3-6). The matching is made
based on the flow attributes. If there are more than one candidate flows, the closest
in (future) time is chosen. It is possible, nevertheless, that such a flow does not exist,
for example in the case in which the target was a closed destination port. Since the
flow tuple source/destination address/port may appear multiple times in the data set, the
parameter δ ensures that an incoming flow is not correlated with a response too late in
time. Values of δ from 1 to 10 seconds are possible.
After searching for a response flow, the algorithm proceeds with retrieving the best
matching log event (lines 7-10). The log event must match the flow characteristics.
The timing constraint in this case forces the log event to be in the interval between
the beginning and the end of the flow. Moreover, since log files do not provide us with
millisecond precision and multiple alerts can be generated by the same host in the same
second, we require the matching log event to not have been consumed before (line 9).
If the matching event exists, the algorithm will create the alert and correlate it with the
flow and, if possible, with the response flow (lines 11-16). Finally, the log event will be
marked as consumed (line 15).
Algorithm 1 Correlation procedure
1: procedure ProcessFlowsForService (s : service)
2: for all Incoming flows F1 for the service s do
3: Retrieve matching response Flow F2 such as
4: F2.Isrc = F1.Idst ∧ F2.Idst = F1.Isrc ∧ F2.Psrc = F1.Pdst ∧ F2.Pdst = F1.Psrc ∧
5: F1.Tstart ≤ F2.Tstart ≤ F1.Tstart + δ
6: with smallest F2.Tstart − F1.Tstart ;
7: Retrieve a matching log event L such as
8: L.Isrc = F1.Isrc ∧ L.Idst = F1.Idst ∧ L.Psrc = F1.Pdst ∧ L.Pdst = F1.Psrc ∧
9: F1.Tstart ≤ L.T ≤ F1.Tend ∧ not L.Corr
10: with smallest L.T − F1.Tstart ;
11: if L exists then
12: Create alert A = (L.T, L.Descr, L.Auto, L.Succ, s,CONN).
13: Correlate F1 to A ;
14: if F2 exists then
15: Correlate F2 to A ; L.Corr ← true ;
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
Alerts for outgoing attacks Some of the incoming attacks against the ssh were suc-
cessful. As a consequence, the attacker used the honeypot machine itself to launch ssh
scans and dictionary attacks against other machines. In order to generate alerts for these
outgoing attacks, we have analyzed the typescripts of the ssh sessions. This allowed
us to reconstruct the times and the destinations of the different attacks launched from
the honeypot. Similarly to the previous step, we have used this information to find the
corresponding flows and to correlate them to alerts of type CONN.
Alerts for side effects Several attacks towards and from the honeypot have caused
non-malicious network traffic that we consider as “side effects”. Most notably, ssh and
ftp connection attempts caused ICMP traffic and traffic directed to the auth/ident
service (port 113) of the attacker, respectively, the honeypot. Furthermore, one attacker
installed an IRC proxy on the honeypot. For these flows, we have created alerts of type
SIDE EFFECT with Serv = ICMP, respectively, Serv = auth or Serv = IRC.
3.4 Generation of cluster alerts and causality information
The alerts described in the previous section represent single security incidents and are
directly correlated with one or more flows. In addition to those basic alerts, we also gen-
erate so-called cluster alerts and extra-information describing the causal relationships
between alerts.
Cluster alerts are used to label logical groups of alerts. For example, in the case of
an ssh scan consisting of 100 connection attempts, we create basic alerts of type CONN
for each connection, plus one cluster alert of type SCAN for the entire scan operation.
More formally, a basic alert A belongs to a scan alert C, if (i) the alert A has the same
source IP and type as the other alerts in the cluster, and (ii) the alert is not later than γ
seconds after the latest alert in the cluster. In our case we set γ = 5 seconds.
As a final step, we manually add causality information. In the current setup, that
means that we have created (i) links between the alert representing an attacker’s suc-
cessful log-in attempt into the honeypot via ssh and all alerts raised by the attacker dur-
ing that ssh session, and (ii) links between the alerts of the ICMP and auth/ident
flows and the alerts of the ssh and ftp flows that caused them.
Our data set has been implemented in a MySQL database. The structure of the
database reflects the alert and flow structure and the relations between these categories.
4 The Labeled Data Set
The processing of the dumped data and logs, collected over a period of 6 days, resulted
in 14.2M flows and 7.6M alerts.
4.1 Flow and Alert breakdown
Figure 2(a) and 2(b) present a breakdown of the flows according to the level 3 protocols
and the most active services, respectively.
At network level, the collected data set presents a subdivision in only three IP proto-
cols: ICMP, TCP and UDP. The majority of the flows has protocol TCP (almost 99.9%
of the entire traffic). A second slice of the data set consists of ICMP traffic (0.1%). Fi-
nally, only a negligible fraction is due to UDP traffic. The level 3 protocol breakdown is
consistent with the services flow breakdown, shown in Figure 2(b). The honeypot most
active service has been ssh, followed on the distance by auth/ident.
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Fig. 2. Flow breakdown according to the level 3 protocol (a) and the service traffic (b)
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the alert breakdown according to malicious connections
and scans on the most active services. ssh and auth/ident are the only services for
which the honeypot has been both a target and a source. The honeypot received several
thousand ssh connections and it has been responsible of millions of outgoing ones. On
the contrary, it has been the target of extensive auth/ident requests, but it produced
only 6 outgoing connection to port 113. As shown in Figure 3(b), the ssh alerts can be
grouped into 45 scans, 10 incoming and 35 targeting remote destinations. We also have
been the target of 4 http scans. None of the ftp, auth/ident or irc alerts can be
clustered into scans.
4.2 Honeypot target and source behavior
Figure 4(a) presents the five most contacted ports on the honeypot. Port 113 (auth/ident
service) is the most targeted one. Among the services we monitored, the most often con-
tacted ones are ssh (port 22) and http (port 80). On these ports we actually received
malicious traffic, confirming our initial idea that daily used services are normally target
of attacks. The incoming traffic on port 68 is due to periodical renew of the dynami-
cally assigned IP address (dhcp). Finally, we received traffic on port 137 due to the
netbios protocol, to which we never responded.
Figure 4(b) presents the top 5 ports contacted by the honeypot on remote destina-
tions. The hit list is opened by ssh, confirming the alert breakdown in Figure 3. Traffic
directed to port 67 has been generated by dhcp and it matches the incoming traffic
on port 68. The traffic on port 53 (dns) was directed to the University dns servers.
The outgoing traffic towards port 80 consists of only RST packets. The dumped traffic
shows that remote hosts contacted us with SYN/ACK packets from port 80. Since the
honeypot never initiated this interaction, it reset the connections. For its characteristics,
this traffic seems not to be related to attacks: we suspected it is a form of background
radiation [19, 20], or part of a SYN/ACK scan. Traffic to port 1 is negligible (tcpmux).
4.3 Discussion on the data set
This section will discuss the results we obtained as outcome of the correlation process,
pointing out the characteristic of both the labeled and unlabeled traffic. Our correlation
process succeeded in labeling more that 98.5% of the flows and almost the totality of
the alerts (99.99%).
Malicious traffic All the labeled traffic is related to the monitored services. Since we
did not interfere in any way with the data collection process, i.e., we avoided any form
of attack injection and we did not advertise our infrastructure on hacker chats, we can
assume that the attacks present in the data set reflect the situation on real networks.
The majority of the attacks targeted the ssh service and they can be divided into
two categories: the automated and the manual ones. The first ones are well-known auto-
mated brute force scans, where a program enumerates usernames and passwords from
large dictionary files. This attack is particularly easy to observe at flow level, since it
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Fig. 4. Top 5 contacted ports. Figure (a) presents the incoming traffic, while Figure (b) the outgo-
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generates a new flow for each connection. Attacks of the second type are manual con-
nection attempts. There are 28 of these in our trace and 20 of them succeed.
The http alerts labeled in our data set are automated attacks that try to compromise
the service by executing a scripted series of connections. These scans are executed using
tools like Nikto and Whisker, both easily available online. Differently from the ssh
connections, no manual http attacks are present.
Regarding the ftp traffic, the data set contains only 6 connections to this service
on the honeypot, during which a ftp session has been opened and immediately closed.
Even if the connections did not have a malicious content, this behavior could be part of
a reconnaissance performed by an attacker gathering information about the system.
Side-effect traffic Part of the traffic in our data set is the side effect of attacks but
cannot be considered by itself malicious. auth/ident, ICMP and irc traffic fall in
this category. The scanning activities have been responsible of the majority of the flows
to and from port 113. The service is supposed, indeed, to retrieve additional information
about the source of a ssh connection. Regarding the ICMP traffic, more that 120,000
incoming packets have type time exceeded and destination unreachable and come from
networks that the honeypot scanned.
The analysis of the honeypot showed that a hacker installed an IRC proxy that re-
ceived chat messages from several channels. It does not appear anyway that any mes-
sage has been sent from our honeypot or that the channels have been used for any
malicious activity. Even if this traffic is due to an application that we did not originally
install on our machine, we decided not to label it as malicious but as a side effect.
Unknown traffic and uncorrelated alerts For a small fraction of the data set, we can-
not establish the malicious/benign nature of the traffic. This traffic consists of three main
components: (i) ssh connections for which it has not be possible to find a matching
alert, (ii) heterogeneous traffic, containing all the flows having as destination a closed
honeypot port and (iii) some not malicious connections to the http and vnc services.
The vnc service was accessible because of the XEN virtualization software running on
the honeypot. Strangely, no attacker identified this service and tried to compromise it by
using known vulnerabilities or performing a brute-force dictionary attack on the pass-
word . The vnc flows in the data set are originating from two hosts which contacted
the service but did not complete the connection.
Regarding the alerts, for few of them (0.01%) no matching traffic has been found.
This makes us aware that during the collection phase some packets that reached our
honeypot have not been recorded by tcpdump.
5 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to present the first labeled data set for flow-based
intrusion detection. While approaching the problem of creating a labeled data set, we
consider the choice of the proper data collection infrastructures a crucial point. It has
indeed impact not only on the feasibility of the labeling, but also on the reliability of
the result. We studied several data collection infrastructures, enlightening strengths and
drawbacks. We conclude that, in the case of flow-based data sets, the most promising
measurement setup is monitoring a single host with enhanced logging capabilities. In
the specific context of this experiment, the host was a honeypot. The information col-
lected permitted us to create a data base of flows and security events (alerts).
The paper also describes a semi-automated correlation process that matches flows
with security events and, in addition, reflects the causality relations between the security
events themselves. The results of the correlation process show that we have been able to
label more that 98% of the flows in the trace. The correlation process also proves that,
although we limited our measurements to a single host, labeling remains a complex task
that requires human intervention.
The approach we propose in this paper allows us to capture unexpected security
events, such as the behavior of a compromised host. However, the presented trace
mainly consists of malicious traffic. For evaluation of an IDS, this means that our data
set allows to detect false negatives but not false positives. In the future, we aim at ex-
tending our monitoring setup to more challenging scenarios. An example would be a
server that is daily accessed by benign users. Monitoring such a server would result in
a trace with a more balanced content of malicious and normal traffic. We believe that
an approach similar to the one we presented in this paper will be useful also in this
scenario. Finally, the data set is available on e-mail request to the authors.
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